Victims of war have existed since time immemorial and in the same vein, so have certain mechanisms for the redress of their injuries. Admiralty courts in early modern Europe are historical platforms in which certain groups of victims of maritime conflict could seek compensation under an international prize jurisdiction, as per the law of nations. This article will briefly introduce the reader to the way in which European countries applied their prize jurisdiction. It will then focus on compensation cases during the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century to show how admiralties implemented the right to compensation during these conflicts.
Introduction
Compensation for victims of war is often seen as a modern idea, one born from the horrors of the early twentieth century. Civil actions for compensation in particular seem to have proliferated after the Great War. But victims of war have existed, in one shape or form, since time immemorial and in the same vein, so have certain mechanisms for the redress of their injuries. Historical admiralty court records show the profound substantive and procedural legal rights that were bestowed upon victims of maritime conflict, quite often seamen and merchants, as well as their families. To begin with, it is important to note that, fundamentally, admiralty courts were legal institutions. They dealt with general maritime issues such as salvage, seamen's wages and general disputes. However, admiralty courts had a very prominent role to play in the materialisation of reparation rights during and after war. The practices of admiralty courts also have a lot to tell us about the history of international law, aside from mere theory. They were international law in practice, giving the admiralty court the character of an international court in many ways. More accurately, they were permanent courts in place to deal with all issues relating to prize during times of war, but also national courts applying international laws and shaping these laws in the process.
Cases relating to war fell under the realms of prize. For instance, in war, taking property from the enemy side was good prize if privateers and navy ships adhered to all the (legal and procedural) rules on prize. Particularly from the seventeenth century onwards, privateering became extremely lucrative for both the state and individual privateers alike. It involved the capture of ships, war supplies, valuable property and even, on occasion, those on board as prisoners of war. Many wars from the early modern period saw privateering practices as one of the main tools employed by states to defeat the enemy, whilst making a financial profit in the process. The captures, however, had to be deemed legal.
However, not all captures and injuries done to merchant ships were in fact legal and many innocents could get caught up in the firing line. Those injured unlawfully during war had the possibility of attending a session at an admiralty court to seek restitution of property and/or compensation for injuries. They would have to prove that the capture was illegal via an evidentiary process in place, as in the case of the English Court of Admiralty. The courts could then, upon following established procedures, authorise the restitution of private property back to its former owners or even order monetary compensation. Alternatively, admiralties could authorise commissions, or letters of marque, to allow the wronged victim to capture the enemy's goods by way of compensation. Interestingly, victims could also consist of families of those injured.
In practice, many of the successful victims were neutrals, non-belligerents and quite often victims of collateral damage. Whilst captures of enemy property were deemed lawful and therefore not always legally subject to reparation, there may have been instances where even belligerent subjects were successful in their reparation claim, most likely when the Executive would interfere for the purpose of diplomatic relations. If they were not successful, they still had the right to have their claim heard via this established litigation process. Prize law, as applied by these courts, therefore gave injured persons affected by privateering practices the ability to air their grievances at admiralty court sessions and be granted some form of reparation to mend their injury.
The transnational processes that these admiralty courts functioned within meant that every country, including its citizens, could sue in the courts of others, which were all governed by one and the same law, equally known to each other. This was accepted by England and as far as it was concerned, instilled in 'mutual convenience, eternal principles of justice, wise policy and the consent of nations, which had established a system of procedure, a code of law, and a court for the trial of prize.' 1 Before delving into the in-depth detail surrounding the ability for individuals to claim reparation for their wartime injury, this article will briefly introduce the reader to the way in which European countries applied their prize jurisdiction and highlight the intertwinement between national courts and international law. It will then focus on compensation cases during the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century to show how admiralties implemented the right to compensation during these conflicts.
An Introduction to Prize Jurisdiction in Europe
Prize rules stemmed from the maritime laws of Europe and were of an international (and civilian) character. Wartime issues of capture and injury fell within the bracket of prize law, which was distinct from the usual maritime laws and fell under a specific prize jurisdiction.
States agreed that prize law would conform to the law of nations. The law of nations, despite being an ambiguous, yet complex term at one and the same, can quite broadly be described as the rules that governed the behaviour and practices of states and the relations between them, as derived from general usages and opinion. This meant that many European states ought to, at least in theory, consistently follow the same prize rules as their European neighbours. And this observance to the law of nations meant states followed the provision of reparation rule too. This was declared by many treaties of that time. However, in reality, a uniform set of principles was not always reflected with a uniform set of practices. Political agendas and national traditions could lead to variations on certain aspects of prize law and more often than not, these variations stemmed from the benefit that the state would gain from either being a All of these admiralty mechanisms in these European states allowed for the dispute resolution of individuals affected by war, including foreign victims not subject of that state. Whilst this section has merely provided a brief description of the mechanisms, it is to highlight the transnational network in which they lay to provide an effective platform for dispute resolution across borders. The resolution could by all means include compensation claims allowing both monetary compensation and restitution of illegally captured property. The following section provides insight into specific cases of war damage stemming from the Anglo-Dutch Wars and how those affected could resort to admiralty courts to seek compensation. The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth were a set of maritime wars that played enormous havoc to the lives of ordinary merchants, seamen and their families -so much so that the number of cases of war victims brought to the Court of Admiralty during these wars increased dramatically. This is likely a reflection of the astounding increase in the number of prizes that had been seized during the wars as well. Lunsford states that during the First and Second
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Anglo-Dutch Wars, privateers from Zeeland alone had captured prizes to the value of f3.5
million. 11 The role of these courts to show how injured individuals could in fact obtain compensation is therefore imperative. The Admiralty's jurisdiction in dealing with reparations was applicable during the wars, but was also additional to any reparation provisions that were provided by the treaties ending the wars, namely, One particular provision allowed for the restitution of ships to 'the well-affected retaken from the Enemy'. 16 This clause stated that:
(…) if any prize or prizes so taken, or any part thereof, shall appear and be proved in the said Court of Admiralty, to be any ship or goods belonging to any of the wellaffected and good people of England or of Ireland, remaining and continuing under the protection of the Parliament, and before taken or surprised from them by any Enemy or Rebel, or disaffected person, and afterwards again surprised and retaken by any of the Fleet or Ships imployed or to be imployed in the service of the Parliament (…) shall be adjudged to be restored.
17
Only subjects of England and Ireland whose ship or property had been retaken from the enemy could claim restitution of their property at the Court of Admiralty. 18 An English privateer could not seize English property. For our purposes, focus lays specifically with the prize division, which had the competence to deal with compensation via a commission issued by the Crown and Parliament. Despite the intense conflicts and competition besieging the court system of England during the seventeenth century, common law writs of prohibition, which challenged the admiralty jurisdiction, affected only the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court. The prize jurisdiction of the Court, usually exercised in time of war only, was not, to a large extent, affected.
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As mentioned, the admiralty court functioned in addition to any treaty provisions. Whilst an amnesty clause in a treaty prevented claims for restitution and damages, it did not preclude claims of wartime injury to be submitted at an admiralty court where prize law dictated that captures could be brought into these courts and those aggrieved could argue against the capture. Since the resolution of reparation cases affected the peace between England and the Elizabeth and John were captured during the war. The fear of capture leads us to believe that Paige was a crestfallen character, whose overwhelming desires towards ownership of vessels turned into a habit of simply freighting them. 41 This was also due, in part, to his lack of faith in the available legal remedies available for merchant losses during the war. In reacting to the seizure of The Golden Star by a Dutch man-of-war, Paige believed that reparation was an aspiration and not a reality: 'No remedy but patience. This is the fruit of our unhappy war
Paige's perception of the injustice of the law was never more evident than in the case of one of his employer's ships, which the Dutch had subsequently burnt. Having taken the ship to the Admiralty Court to prove his loss, two witnesses whom he had brought in to aid him in his claim, provided false statements about the nature of the ship. The Court did not legitimise the statements and it was not clear whether the false statements had been made maliciously. He was not able to recover any money for his losses. He later stated: 'though it be law, I am sure it's not equity'. 43 Whilst Paige felt disheartened by the Admiralty system, other members of society felt that it gave every private person 'a potential voice and liberty to act as he pleases, however unbecoming or unreasonable it may be'. 44 This indicates a more promising postconflict environment, placing the Court of Admiralty in England as a significant platform for the implementation of reparation rights.
41 C. 105/12, Paynter to Clerke, 13 July and 25 August 1656, ns. 42 Steckley, 'Letters' 72. 43 ibid, 78a. 44 ibid, para 178. Oddly enough, one case that at this time had caught the attention of many lawyers and led to these kinds of affirmations was one involving a London merchant, Ricaut. He had been brazenly maintaining that wool -which had been released by the Admiralty Court, given that it had been proved to belong to the King of Spain -was his and that the King of Spain did in fact owe him money: money which was in fact higher in amount than the wool itself. This was a very serious case and the claims were even deemed legitimate, although the eventual outcome is not known. Even so, much excitement was caused as a result of this case and many feared that this would even open the floodgates for individuals to sue a head of state in this way.
In comparison to Britain, the Dutch Republic had a differently organised state structure. The admiralty reflected the disparity within the political and legal framework of the Dutch Republic and was divided into boards. 45 In fact, it had five admiralty boards that lay in five of the different municipalities to deal with prize related matters. They included the admiralty board for South Holland or the Maas, which rested at Rotterdam; the board for Zeeland at Middelburg; the board for North Holland at Amsterdam; the board at Hoorn or Enkhuizen for West Friesland (or otherwise known as the North Quarter); and the board at Dokhum, and then Harlingen in 1645, sitting for Friesland. 46 Seven commissioners sat on the boards, with the highest officers appointed by the States General and more junior ones appointed by the admiralty boards themselves. The Admiral, or the Vice Admiral in his place, also had the power to sit at every one of them, but it was in fact the States General that was responsible for the entire supervision of the admiralties. 47 Since coordination was weak amongst the admiralty boards, meetings at The Hague known as Haagsche Besognes attempted to facilitate supervision, most prominent after 1648.
48
The financial functioning of the Dutch admiralties posed a problem to the payment of reparation after war. In England, parliamentary supremacy meant financial autonomy, in which funds could be borrowed and profits allocated whenever needed, with the only restrictions deriving from government. In the Dutch Republic, the political makeup made claims processes difficult. However, it was not uncommon for injured individuals to make 45 The Chambers have also been referred to as 'Boards', see Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ed), Compensation claims from the Anglo-Dutch Wars show that the usual claimants at both the English and Dutch admiralties during and after these wars were those with neutral status. In many cases however, these neutrals were not really neutral and had lost their neutral status due to belligerent-type acts. In these situations, it was deemed that they were belligerent.
However, even in cases where neutrals had acted as a belligerent, admiralty judges could still pointed towards redress. Whilst one will notice the legal procedures and cases of compensation, it is also interesting to observe the distinct procedural differences between the English Admiralty in comparison to the Dutch, despite both following the 'law of nations'.
Bond and Bail
Whilst prize law itself was at the cornerstone of how admiralty judges ruled on reparation cases, of importance is how admiralty courts, in practice, financed reparation claims. Though the national budget was an option and sometimes provided funds for victims of war, the admiralty courts success in paying damages to victims can also be attributed to the bond and bail mechanism. Bond and bail placed a procedural obligation on all captors wishing to partake in privateering during war. It involved the payment of money into the admiralty court by way of security, usually by respectable guarantors selected by the privateer. Sometimes they would be the ship owners, the captain, book-keepers, or even an individual not related to the business of privateering at all, but merely with a relation to the commander.
In England, the provision of bond money had been in existence since the fifteenth century and could vary depending on the size of the ship. Should the privateer act in violation of prize law and capture the goods of innocent persons, that money could be forfeited and/or awarded as damages to the injured party. It was a way of ensuring good conduct on part of the privateering commander and his crew. Most admiralty courts necessitated the giving of bail money, which had been a long established, consistent practice outlined by the rules governing privateering. All types of privateers were instructed to follow these prior to the initiation of armed conflict. This practice was more explicitly affirmed and formalized during the period of the seventeenth century, when sea-wars, such as the Anglo-Dutch wars, and competition for global trade was most prominent. The giving of bail was therefore an existing reparative tool to prevent any misconduct of privateers, but also to compensate for injury that was done in wartime:
without any security whatever having been given for their conduct, which is uniformly required and taken in the most solemn manner from every Privateer (…) noncommissioned vessels would be roving about, committing Acts of Violence and depredation on such ships as they might fall in with (…).
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A later draft article declared 'that all persons on either side that shall go out to sea on particular commissions, shall before they take out their commissions, put in good and sufficient security before the Judges of the Court where the commission issues by responsible Men, not of the Ships Company, not to for any injury or wrongh to the people or inhabitants of each other'. These alleviated the risk of potential future reparation claims and allowed the payment of the same should such claims materialize. This admiralty court rule of giving surety was a successful mechanism to ensure good practices on the seas and to limit unlawful wartime injury as much as possible. It adds weight to the importance of the admiralty court's role for the individual victim of war in the early modern period.
Concluding Remarks
Admiralty courts in Europe in the early modern period allowed individuals injured during war to seek compensation through established transnational legal processes. They were instrumental to the application of international laws at that time, more aptly referred to as the law of nations. Whilst the cases in this article have quite clearly shown the apparent tendency for such victims to constitute neutrals (whether authentic or not), even if compensation was not granted, the process of litigation proved commendable for the purposes of truth-seeking.
Nonetheless, there is a slight bitterness to this story of perceived justice when one thinks of 56 National Archives, HCA 25/13. 57 PRO, HCA 45/12. the more-than-occasional dominance of diplomatic relations, interests of the state and consequently, the moulding of who the 'victim' should actually be. Furthermore, whilst the workings of admiralty courts in different countries showed the (idealistic) observance to the substantive law of nations, inevitable differences in national procedural rules and political interests made unwavering obedience to the law of nations completely impossible. It is these points that may have interrupted the judicial powers at these courts to justly follow existing rules and procedures on compensation, despite the existence of this permanent compensatory platform. The bond and bail mechanism inherent within these courts do, however, show that compensation potential went beyond merely a right, to actual implementation. This indispensable aspect of the admiralty court, to materialise the right to compensation, proves undeniably valuable for those injured during war. It was not only beneficial for the ius post bellum, but also the ius in bello in its purpose to prevent misconduct through the giving of security. With all this evidence on the wonders of the early modern admiralty court, as precursors to international rules on war and peace today, it begs the question why more research on this has not been done and why the stones of this crucial aspect of the history of international law have been left unturned?
